New alternative market models are needed to incentivize companies to invest in developing new antibacterial drugs. In a previous publication, the Transatlantic Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance (TATFAR) summarized the key areas of consensus for economic incentives for antibacterial drug development. That work determined that there was substantial agreement on the need for a mixture of push and pull incentives and particularly those that served to delink the revenues from the volumes sold. Pull incentives reward successful development by increasing or ensuring future revenue. Several pull incentives have been proposed that could substantially reward the development of new antibacterial drugs. In this second article authored by representatives of TATFAR, we examine the advantages and disadvantages of different pull incentives for antibacterial drug development. It is TATFAR's hope that this analysis, combined with other related analyses, will provide actionable information that will shape policy makers' thinking on this important issue.
Antimicrobial resistance is a profound global health threat of the 21st century. The United Kingdom's AMR Review estimates that by 2050 as many as 10 million persons a year will die of drug-resistant infections if solutions are not found [1] . The World Bank projects that, without containment of antimicrobial resistance, annual global gross domestic product will decrease by 1%, that is, >$1 trillion annually from 2030, and the hardest hit will be persons in low-income countries [2] .
Although resistance levels are increasing globally, the world currently lacks the drug candidates to ensure a diverse and robust pipeline of antibacterial drugs to withstand technical attrition and increasing drug resistance [3, 4] . As of December 2016, there were only 38 candidates in the antibacterial clinical development pipeline [5] . Most of these products will not reach the market, and only a handful of candidates are expected to have activity against urgent threat pathogens. The World Health Organization has identified a list of 12 pathogens that represent the global public health need for new antibiotics [6] . Without new antibiotics targeting these pathogens, mortality rates for untreatable infections are expected to increase. This would represent a step backward in modern medicine, not only for the treatment of infections but also for the ability to perform standard surgeries and cancer chemotherapy, areas that require effective antibiotics as prophylaxis [7] .
The lack of antibacterial drug candidates is a function of both the scientific challenges of antibacterial drug development and the lack of profitability that currently exists in the antibiotic market, particularly when compared with other therapeutic areas. Antibacterial drug development is hampered by the conventional pharmaceutical business model, in which revenues are based on volume sales. Antibiotics are unique in that the more that they are used, the faster resistance develops [8] . Therefore, society should actually value and reward access to new antibiotics against specified unmet public health needs, not sales volumes.
Several reports have examined the economics of antibacterial drug development and have made recommendations on incentives that could be implemented to make development more commercially attractive [1, [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . Nearly all of these reports stress the need for alternative business models to spur innovation in antibacterial drug development.
The reports call for increases in "push" incentives, which lower the cost to develop a new antibacterial drug as well as the use of "pull" incentives, which reward only a successful result. That is, funding for push incentives reduces the overall cost of research and development (R&D), and pull incentives ensure a viable market. An overview is provided in Table 1 . To date, governments have largely only provided push incentives for antibiotic development, typically in the form of grants and public private partnerships, as well as regulatory disincentives [15] . The notable exception is the US Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) Act, which provides 5 years of additional market exclusivity for new antibiotics [16] . To date, 5 antibiotics have received additional market exclusivity under this act [6] . None possesses a novel mechanism of action.
In the European Union, the upcoming new legislative proposal on veterinary medicines provides incentives for the development of new antimicrobials, that is, an extended protection of technical documentation. Furthermore, the European Medicine Agency launched a new scheme, PRIME (priority medicines), to enhance support for the development of new innovative medicines and to accelerate the assessment of regulatory applications and for medicines targeting an unmet medical need. PRIME has the potential to encourage the development and accelerate approval of new classes of antibiotics. Without an attractive market for antibiotics, private sector investment will continue to decrease. The number of large pharmaceutical companies that invest in antibacterial R&D has decreased significantly in the last 3 decades, to only about 5 companies today [17] .
The Transatlantic Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance (TATFAR), comprising the United States, the European Union, Norway, and Canada, works together to coordinate intergovernmental action on antimicrobial resistance [18] . In 2015, TATFAR elected to examine the issue of economic incentives for antibacterial drug development, with the goal of determining areas of global consensus and conducting an analysis to determine the incentives that promote innovation while ensuring access and appropriate use. This article discusses the major pull incentives that have been discussed in several policy documents or in peer reviewed publications and provides the advantages and disadvantages of each. The representatives of TATFAR believe that this analysis will inform upcoming policy decisions regarding the development of a package of economic incentives needed to spur innovation in antibacterial drug development.
Governmental intervention of a pull incentive is meant to strengthen market-based mechanisms for developing novel antibiotics. Without such of intervention, the market will begin to function too late, that is, when there is significant drug resistance. Because developing new antibiotics takes more than a decade, it is critical to act now by spelling out the critical pathogens and incentivizing R&D.
This article focuses on 6 pull incentives [1] : higher reimbursement [2] ; diagnosis confirmation [10, 19] ; market entry reward, fully delinked [9, 10, 20] ; market entry reward, market priced [1, 10, 19] ; tradable exclusivity voucher; and [20] options market [11] . Each incentive possesses varying effects in terms of promoting innovation, ensuring patient access, aligning to stewardship objectives, and sustainability. The merits of each incentive are discussed below. Outstanding policy questions that should be considered before implementation of an incentive package are listed in Table 2 .
HIGHER REIMBURSEMENT
One potentially effective means to incentivizing antibacterial drug development is to increase the price of the medicines to be commensurate with the public health value they provide. This is today's business model, adjusted with a larger appetite to pay higher prices. Antibiotics have historically been priced much lower than drugs in other therapeutic areas such as oncology and typically not priced commensurate with the curative benefit they provide. Antibiotics possess barriers to setting a higher price, because regulatory approval is often based on data from noninferiority trials, and a meaningful market differentiation can be challenging to obtain. Higher prices may positively affect conservation or stewardship but, at the same time, reduce access. This is especially the case for patients without health insurance, such as those living in low-and middle-income countries.
Higher prices may also compel companies to market their drug more robustly to achieve greater sales. This could include the promotion of empiric use of a novel antibiotic, in which empiric use may not be justifiable for public health reasons. In addition, higher prices would probably incentivize only innovations for which the market size is deemed sufficiently largefor example, broad-spectrum antibiotics. Again from a public health perspective it may be advisable to increase the innovation of narrow-spectrum or pathogen-specific antibiotics to lessen the selection pressure on normal flora. This may extend the longevity of the antibiotic's utility. In summary, alignment of pricing of antibacterial drugs to more of a value-based approach would probably result in greater innovation, may create conflicting stewardship results, and may limit patient access. 
DIAGNOSIS CONFIRMATION
A diagnosis confirmation model (which is a derivation of the higher reimbursement model) uses a dual pricing strategy theoretically based on the confirmation of diagnosis of a resistant pathogen. Under this model, antibiotics are priced at a lower empiric treatment cost and a premium cost that would be charged once the diagnosis is confirmed. Clinicians would use the drug empirically and then would de-escalate therapy based on clinical response. If the patient receives therapy for the full treatment duration, then the hospital would be charged the higher premium price. For ease of implementation, pricing is actually based on the duration of treatment. The manufacturer sets the number of days necessary to diagnose, and any longer treatment duration is charged the higher price.
There are several disadvantages to this model. First, this approach has the same disadvantages as the higher reimbursement model in terms of promotion of empiric use and no built-in function to ensure equitable availability to patients. Second, it continues to embrace the existing business model for antibiotics that directly tethers the revenues of an antibiotic to the amount sold. Finally, the decision to use or de-escalate is with the treating physician, and it should be contingent on a robust diagnostic capability (although the use of the diagnostic is not mandated). This reliance on diagnostic capabilities and durations ensures a high degree of complexity in execution and an assumption that an accurate and precise diagnostic is available. This limits the types of antibiotics and the settings in which this model may be effective. Moreover, in some circumstances, treating physicians may face pressure from institutional administrators to make decisions based on cost alone, rather than patient need.
This approach does have some advantages. It encourages de-escalation of therapy when infection with a multidrug-resistant pathogen is not confirmed or strongly suspected. It would promote the use of diagnostics, because their results would be essential in determining whether or not the patient continued to receive the new antibiotic. Data collected from use in the healthcare setting could allow hospitals to maintain a better quality of stewardship, and, ultimately. the model limits the empiric use of the novel therapy as long as cheaper effective options are available.
MARKET ENTRY REWARDS-FULLY DELINKED
Because the return on investment for a new antibiotic is currently directly proportional to the volume sold, the market model for antibiotics is not aligned with public health objectives. Because antibiotics are the only class of drugs whose use limits their utility [8] , this commercialization model ultimately promotes the diminishment of utility for these products. A pull incentive that fully or partially delinks the revenue of a novel antibiotic from the volume sold could be an effective means of aligning public health objectives with an attractive return on investment.
A market entry reward is a series of payments to reward innovation that satisfies predefined public health priorities and provides a predictable return on investment for product developers. The payments are commensurate with the societal value of having the particular antibiotic available. The product developer retains all intellectual property and has responsibility for approval, manufacturing, and distribution of the antibiotic. In the fully delinked model, the payments are the main revenue stream for the antibiotic; units are sold at a contractually agreed price up to a predefined threshold. The payments that are initiated at regulatory approval are tied to contractual conditions that promote stewardship and access. For example, companies would agree to restricted marketing of their drug, transparency of sales volumes, geographic scope of availability, and, for the fully delinked model, the per unit price of the antibiotic. (This price would be set at a level where it is affordable but not cheap, thereby avoiding the perverse incentive that a novel antibiotic is suddenly cheaper than an existing generic.) Advantages of market entry reward models include their abilities to provide a known return on investment for developers, to be targeted to antibiotics of high unmet medical need, and to be designed with provisions that could ensure global access and appropriate use. Another advantage is the potential opportunity to coordinate the market entry rewards/delinkage payments globally via a global purchaser, as suggested elsewhere [1] . The main challenge with market entry reward models is the cost of sustaining them. Payments under a fully delinked market entry reward model would total between approximately $1-2.5 billion per antibiotic, spread over multiple years [1] . ^o ensure sustainability, a fund, tax, or other revenue-generating mechanism would need to be established. A tax on generic outpatient antibiotic use may be an effective means of sustaining a market entry reward fund while providing a disincentive for inappropriate use of antibiotics in the outpatient setting.
MARKET ENTRY REWARDS-MARKET-PRICED
A variation of the fully delinked market entry reward is one in which smaller reward payments (approximately $500 million in total) are used to top up conventional unit-based revenues. This model is partially delinked and aims to increase the market attractiveness with a series of annual payments that supplement the annual sales. The primary advantage of this economic incentive is its low level of secondary disruptive effects, meaning that the market consequences of this incentive are relatively low, particularly compared with other incentives, such as fully delinked market entry rewards or the tradable exclusivity vouchers. It is also more sustainable than a fully delinked market entry reward owing to the smaller sums and its potential to work with existing reimbursement mechanisms. The payments can also still be tied to sustainable use and access stipulations.
TRADABLE EXCLUSIVITY VOUCHERS
A tradable exclusivity voucher is an award granted to a developer on regulatory approval of a novel antibiotic meeting predefined criteria. It allows the owner to extend the market exclusivity period for any drug in its portfolio or sell it to another company. This incentive is based on other schemes that increase marketing exclusivity to achieve desired outcomes; for example, both the European Union and the United States have adopted additional market exclusivity periods for medicines studied in pediatric populations. The novelty of this mechanism is that the extension is transferable to nonrelated medicines. Therefore, a tradable exclusivity voucher would be used to extend the exclusivity period of the most profitable drugs in the market. The price paid for such a voucher would be high, probably in the range of billions of dollars, but it would depend on the profitability of existing patented medicines and the time period of the monopoly extension. Setting controls regarding the price of the voucher would require regular governmental intervention and reduce the attractiveness of the incentive.
Tradable exclusivity vouchers are a powerful incentive and probably likely cause pharmaceutical companies to reinvest in antibacterial drug development. Furthermore, they are sustainable, in that they do not require direct government funding to ensure their continued existence. However, we believe they are an inefficient mechanism for promoting innovation. The incentive to increase antibacterial drug development would be funded by the purchasers of the drug whose monopoly period is extended. This could represent a disproportional level of subsidizing one area of healthcare at the expense of another. Another concern is a negative impact on patient care, by delaying the generic entry (and therefore lower prices) of more widely used medications. The overall cost of this incentive, from both societal and healthcare perspective, may be too great. Finally, tradable exclusivity vouchers do nothing to ensure appropriate use, because the return on investment of the antibiotic remains directly proportional to its volume sold and/or used.
OPTIONS MARKET
Advance market commitments or purchase options have also been proposed as pull incentives [11] . Under this model, the company begins development of a new antibiotic. Options (ie, the right to buy a specified amount of the antibiotic at a later date for a fixed price) could be purchased and redeemed once the drug is approved and on the market. The price of the options would be low if purchased early in development, given the higher uncertainty that the product will make it to market. If purchased late in development, the price would be higher, probably commensurate with the price at which the product would be sold on the commercial market place. The holder of the options could purchase the drug for use or sell the options or antibiotics to governments or patients for a profit once the antibiotic was approved and on the market. If the antibiotic failed to make it to market, the purchaser would lose its investment. This incentive differs from the fully delinked market entry reward in that the investment can come at any time during the R&D process (not only at regulatory approval), and therefore the governmental risk is higher because the product may not reach the market.
An advantage of this approach is that it allows investors to modulate their level of risk based on the phase of development they elect to invest. Significant savings could be realized if the investment is made early, but this is accompanied by greater risk. The options model is limited in its ability to promote stewardship and is also dependent on the free and open exchange of scientific data between developers and the options purchaser. It would also affect access in low-and middle-income countries if the initial options price is set too high.
CONCLUSIONS
There is general consensus on the need for both push and pull incentives to stimulate antibacterial drug development. A mixture of incentives is needed to promote innovation in small, medium, and large enterprises developing multiple types of products capable of treating drug-resistant infections.
Several different models of pull incentives would probably be capable of providing a sufficient return on investment for the development of new antibacterial drugs. Many of these models, including those that would charge higher prices, would probably have secondary disruptive effects that could significantly affect patient access. It is critical that the implementation of any pull incentive is viewed in the overall context of the broader global strategy to combat antimicrobial resistance. The balance of promoting and rewarding innovation while ensuring patient access and aligning stewardship and public health objectives is necessary in the design of any successful pull incentive. Strengthening surveillance systems to monitor the incentive is also integral.
The incentive that seems able to capture those elements reasonably well while concurrently minimizing secondary disruptive effects is the market entry reward market-priced model. Although the delinked option would probably stimulate innovation more effectively, directly benefiting unmet public health needs, we are concerned about the sustainability of the funding levels required. The payments in the market-priced model allow the appropriate leverage to be put in place for the successful incorporation of broader public health and access objectives. Ultimately, it is essential to conduct quantitative modeling of the impact of the various incentives models on measures such as net present value.
Such work is currently being conducted by the Innovative Medicines Initiative's DRIVE-AB (driving reinvestment in research and development and responsible antibiotic use) project. TATFAR looks forward to reviewing the outcomes of this research project as part of its process of proposing possible solutions on a package of both push and pull economic incentives. Many of these models would require either a change in law or substantial increases in funding that would need political endorsement in order to implement. With antimicrobial resistance continuing to gain prominence as an issue globally, it is critical that stakeholders come together to articulate a set of consensus solutions.
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